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Public Policy”, Ottawa, December 4, 2003. Abstract:  The stability of the banking industry around the world has been observed 
as periodical since the Great Depression. Financial markets have changed 
dramatically over the last twenty-five years, introducing more competition for and 
from banks. Banks are the financial institutions responsible for providing liquidity to 
the economy. This responsibility is, however, the main cause of their fragility. Deposit 
insurance is the most efficient instrument for protecting depositors and for preventing 
bank runs. Pricing deposit insurance according to the individual bank’s risk seems to 
be the most appropriate strategy but it does not seem to be sufficient in the sense 
that it seems to remain residual information problems in the market, although there is 
no appropriate statistical analysis on this issue. In 1988, the G10 modified banking 
regulation significantly by setting capital standards for international banks. These 
standards have now been adopted by more than one hundred countries as part of 
their national regulation of banks’ risk. Current regulation of bank capital adequacy 
has its critics because it imposes the same rules on all banks. This seems particularly 
unsuitable when applied to credit risk which is the major source of a bank’s risk 
(about 70%). Moreover, diversification of a bank’s credit-risk portfolio is not taken into 
account in the computation of capital ratios. These shortcomings seem to have 
distorted the behaviour of banks and this makes it much more complicated to monitor 
them. In fact, it is not even clear that the higher capital ratios observed since the 
introduction of this new form of capital regulation necessarily lower risks. Additional 
reform is expected in 2004, but there is as yet no consensus on the form it will take 
nor on whether it will suitably regulate banks in individual countries. Consequently, it 
might be appropriate to continue developing national regulation based on optimal 
deposit insurance (with individual insurance pricing and continuous auditing on 
individual risk) and to keep searching for other optimal complementary instruments 
for use against systemic risk, instruments suitably designed to fit the banking 
industry’s peculiar structure. Other market discipline (such as subordinated debt) and 
governance instruments may be more efficient than the current capital requirement 
scheme for the banks’ commitment problem associated to deposit insurance. The 
central bank should be responsible for aggregate liquidity. Confidence in the financial 
sector is a public good that must be ensured by the government. Who should be in 
charge: the central bank or a regulatory agency? The revised literature seems to say 
that this role should be taken by a regulatory agency independent from the central 
bank and independent from the political power. 
 
 
Keywords:  Bank, liquidity, deposit insurance, capital standard, national regulation, 
credit risk, capital regulation, subordinated debt, governance, capital requirement, 
central bank, regulatory agency. 
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Résumé 
 
La stabilité de l’industrie bancaire a grandement fluctué depuis la Grande Dépression. Les marchés 
financiers ont aussi subi de multiples changements au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années, 
introduisant plus de compétition pour les banques. Les banques sont les institutions financières 
responsables de la création de la liquidité dans l’économie; cette responsabilité est néanmoins la 
principale source de leur fragilité. L’assurance dépôt demeure l’instrument le plus efficace pour 
protéger les déposants et limiter les retraits massifs de liquidités. La tarification de l’assurance dépôt 
basée sur le risque individuel semble être la stratégie la plus appropriée, laissant toutefois un risque 
moral résiduel dans le marché, même si aucune étude statistique n’a vraiment été réalisée à ce sujet. 
En 1988, le G10 a significativement modifié la réglementation des banques en mettant en place des 
règles de détention de capital. Ces règles sont maintenant considérées parties intégrantes de la 
réglementation nationale de plus de 100 pays. La réglementation actuelle n’est cependant pas à l’abri 
de critiques, particulièrement parce qu’elle est appliquée de façon uniforme à toutes les banques. 
Cette critique est pertinente au sujet du risque de crédit, qui représente environ 70 % du risque des 
banques. De plus, les activités de diversification du risque de crédit des banques ne sont pas prises 
en compte. Ces lacunes ont introduit des distorsions dans le comportement des banques, ce qui rend 
encore plus compliquée la surveillance des banques. En fait, il n’est même pas évident que 
l’augmentation observée des ratios de capital corresponde à un risque de défaut plus faible. Une 
révision de la réglementation est prévue en 2004, mais il ne semble pas y avoir de consensus sur la 
forme qu’elle prendra et si elle sera appropriée pour les pays individuels. La meilleure stratégie à 
suivre pourrait donc être l’élaboration d’une réglementation nationale basée sur l’assurance dépôt 
optimale (tarification individuelle du risque et surveillance continue du comportement des banques), 
tout en poursuivant la recherche d’instruments complémentaires pouvant réduire le risque systémique 
à son minimum. D’autres mécanismes de discipline de marché (comme la dette subordonnée) et la 
surveillance de la gouvernance peuvent être plus efficaces que la réglementation actuelle sur le 
capital pour tenir compte du problème d’engagement des banques associé à l’assurance dépôt. La 
banque centrale devrait être responsable de la liquidité agrégée. La confiance dans les marchés 
financiers est un bien public sous la responsabilité du gouvernement. Mais qui doit la gérer  : la 
banque centrale ou un agence indépendante ? La littérature consultée en conclut que ce doit être le 
rôle d’une agence indépendante de la banque centrale et du pouvoir politique. 
 
Mots clés :  Banque, liquidité, assurance dépôt, règle de capital, réglementation nationale, risque de 
crédit, capital réglementé, dette subordonnée, gouvernance, exigence de capital, 





The stability of the banking industry around the world has been observed as periodical since the 
Great Depression. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, the banking industry was stable in North 
America, but the 1980s witnessed the greatest frequency of failures ever recorded during the 
period stretching from the Great Depression to the 1990s (Diamond and Dybvig, 1986). In one of   2
the World Bank’s recent publications, Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) document 117 systemic 
banking crises observed in 93 countries since the late 1970s. Over that same period, 51 non-
systemic banking crises were also observed in 45 countries. The causes of the crises vary from 
runs on banks to runs on national currencies, but these runs represent a subset of all the cases 
documented. Of course, many of the crises come from low-income countries or from transitional 
economies. 
 
However, it is important to mention that, during the 1983-1986 period, fifteen members of the 
Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation failed. Two of these failures were from banks. In the 
United Kingdom, three major banks failed in the 1984-1995 period, while 1,400 savings and loans 
and 1,300 banks failed during the 1984-1991 period in the United States. A large part of these 
failures is explained by the unique structure of this country’s banking industry which is composed 
of a large number of small and vulnerable banks with efficiency and diversification problems 
(Berlin et al., 1991). Savings and loans failures alone accounted for more than $180 billion or 3 
percent of GDP. It was these events that motivated the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
Accord in 1998 and the United States of America’s new Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991. The Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) Act was 
amended as well. Since 1999, the CDIC has been applying to its members a structure of 
differential premiums modelled on the individual risk principle. A final noteworthy fact is that the 
level of losses from bank failures in the 1980s matched those recorded for the 1865-1930 period. 
 
Financial markets have changed dramatically over the last twenty-five years, introducing more 
competition for and from banks: New trading technologies have emerged; many types of 
derivative contracts are currently traded by banks and their competitors; international banking has 
grown; and various regulatory changes have been implemented. To be specific, the 1988 Basle 
(or BIS) Accord introduced international capital regulation for credit risk in the G 10 group of 
countries; and, in 1996, the Accord was extended to market risk, including positions in foreign 
exchange, traded debt securities, traded equities, commodities, and derivatives (Crouhy et al. 
2001). More than 100 countries apply these rules in 2003. The year 2004 is expected to usher in 
significant changes modifying capital requirement rules for credit risk and the year 2006 should 
introduce operational risk regulation. What effects the new regulation is having on banks risk are 
far from obvious. It at least seems to have induced banks to maintain higher capital ratios 
(Jackson et al. 1999). But it is not clear that these higher ratios necessarily represent lower risks, 
because the Accord has also been criticized for having introduced distortions in banks behaviour. 
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Securitization of banks’ credit portfolios has become a widespread phenomenon in industrialised 
countries. At first, banks used to sell their mortgage loans, for such loans represented accurately 
evaluated risks. But since the advent of e-finance, it is now possible to expand this activity to 
other types of loans, including those made to small businesses. This type of activity also allows 
banks to have a much more liquid credit-risk portfolio and, in theory, to adjust their capital ratio to 
an optimal economic level rather than sticking to the ratio decreed by the Basle Committee. One 
important regulatory issue is to know how this activity has in fact affected the risk of banks 
(Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003).  
 
Bancassurance is another financial innovation that is now authorized in many industrial countries. 
Bancassurance is a strategic subject at the core of future concerns in the banking milieu as a 
whole. It removes the barrier separating traditional activities providing insurance products and 
those offering financial services. The new common target becomes the financial portfolios of 
individuals or households and the integrated management of the assets they generate. 
Bancassurance is highly developed in several countries, including France where 61% of life 
insurance collection takes place via bank windows. In non-life insurance, the penetration of 
bancassurance is more modest, representing only 8% of turnover (Benoist, 2002; Dorval, 2002; 
Joly, 2002). How this new integration of activities may affect the bank’s role as a creator of 
liquidity is another important issue that the regulator must take into account when setting new 
rules for the banking industry. 
 
The corporate governance of banks is now under as much scrutiny as that of many enterprises 
(Marcey and O’Hara, 2003). According to these authors, the special nature of banks as concerns 
deposit insurance may generate more moral hazard than in other markets. The structure of 
banks’ balance sheets, with their high leverage conditions and their variation in liquidity for assets 
and liabilities, seems to support the argument that bank directors should assume fiduciary 
obligations to fixed claimants as well as to equity claimants. Banks creditors should be able to 
sue directors for violations of their fiduciary responsibility for prudence and loyalty. More 
concerned with risk management, Blanchard and Dionne (2003) have proposed that members of 
the board’s risk management committee must be competent and independent, meaning that they 
should not be allowed to hold options to purchase the bank’s shares. We must also not forget that 
many North American banks were involved in Enron transactions that may be considered 
problematic in terms of ethics and governance. 
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According to Diamond and Dibvig (1986), the macroeconomics of banking has limited banks to a 
money-supply role. However, banking regulations cannot limit the role of banks to 
macroeconomic considerations, because this approach may destroy the nature of banks by 
preventing them from offering other services, such as liquidity, that are also important for the 
entire economy. This criticism of the macroeconomic approach to banking regulation is 
fundamental and has been supported by many authors over the last fifteen years. In fact the 
microeconomics of banking is now at the heart of developments in the discussion of banking 
regulations, although macroeconomic considerations such as the transmission of monetary policy 
must remain central in the design of an optimal banking system (Van den Heuvel, 2003). 
 
In this article, we shall focus our attention on banking regulation by reviewing the microeconomic 
foundations of banking. Many authors find that the regulation of banks’ risk is not at its optimal 
level (Rochet, 2002; Freixas and Santomero, 2002; Santos, 2000). Some of the measures 
proposed are ex ante (preventive), others are ex post (coverage). Our emphasis will be on 
banking regulation and its relation to the new banking theories, especially those having to do with 
the bank’s role as a financial intermediary and with the links between bank runs and deposit 
insurance. We shall take a close look at the role asymmetric information plays in the design of 
deposit insurance contracts. The risk-based pricing of deposit insurance will also be analysed in 
detail. The evolution of international banking’s regulation of capital requirements will be reviewed 
along with the introduction of other market disciplines such as subordinated debt. Finally, the 
management of banking regulation and the governance of banks will be discussed. 
 
Market imperfections must also be considered in any discussion of banking regulation. We shall 
not, however, cover this part of the literature which has been presented in many documents or 
reports (see, for example, Freixas and Rochet, 1997; Ottawa, 1998; Roy, 1997, 2001). 
 
Various forms of risk regulation have been suggested. One possibility is to regulate the freedom 
to withdraw deposits. Another is to let depositors withdraw their money and have the central bank 
or deposit insurance reimburse the depositors for their losses. When such public regulation is 
properly understood by all participants, bank runs related to panics will be prevented. This 
scenario is, however, only feasible if depositors’ decisions are independent of economic 
conditions and limited to one or very few banks. The depositor’s decision to withdraw may also 
come at times when overall economic factors are observed to be sound. It may even occur when 
there is confidence in the overall banking system.  
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For example, bank runs may be explained by the failure of many small firms or borrowers facing 
negative economic conditions. The borrowers fail to reimburse their banks and depositors may 
then start to get nervous about the solvability of the banks. If this behaviour is not just local but 
affects many depositors from many banks, we may see an economic panic where many 
depositors will lose confidence in the banking system, withdraw their money, and thus create 
systemic risk or bank panic that may prove very costly for the entire economy. Other forms of 
protection against systemic risk must be considered for these events; simply offering deposit 
insurance may not be enough. In other words, deposit insurance alone may not keep confidence 
in the entire system from collapsing. However, there is no satisfactory model for systemic risk in 
the literature. (See Rochet and Tirole, 1996, for a first attempt; see also Allen and Gale, 2000)  
 
Other forms of regulation, such as those dealing with capital adequacy, are more closely 
associated with prevention than with compensation. Since implementation of the 1988 Basle 
Accord, many countries have been applying risk-based capital ratios to monitor banks’ risk. This 
practice has been questioned because of the possible distortions it may have introduced in 
banks’ behaviour. One possible problem is that traditional capital ratios may not measure the true 
risk banks face. Recent reports on the agenda for modifications of the current regulation indicate 
that there is no consensus on how to regulate banks’ capital (Santos, 2000). 
 
Before discussing regulation in the banking sector we must introduce the key concept of bank 
runs, because this is the basic event justifying such regulation. By definition, bank runs are 
caused by depositors trying to withdraw their assets from the bank to avoid a loss of capital. Runs 
may be set off by a threatened drop in the value of bank assets or of loans made through the 
monetary system and they may result in loss of confidence in banks. Yet recent empirical studies 
show that the runs occurring in the Great depression did not necessarily confirm that definition. 
Bank runs do not require a drop in the value of underlying assets (Bernake, 1983). Variation in 
the costs of intermediation services may also affect the economy and such variation has been 
shown to be an explanatory factor in the length and depth of the Great Depression. Withdrawals 
may be explained by other reasons: A run on some particular bank may also affect the mood of 
depositors in a number of banks and spell danger for the banking system as a whole. Speculative 
runs do occur, but bank runs can also be motivated by rational behaviour and may happen in 
healthy banks. In other words, even banks known to be safe and efficient have gone bankrupt. 
 
Bank runs usually generate systemic risk and do real damage because they interrupt the flow of 
profitable investments and real consumption (externalities because the financial markets are not   6
complete). A number of possible public interventions are available to limit the externalities related 
to bank failures brought on by bank runs, and we plan to cover them in this survey. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section proposes a short history of 
banking regulation. The nature of banks is then discussed in detail. The next two sections discuss 
the different forms of regulation and deposit insurance. In the second part of the paper, we cover 
other subjects, such as capital adequacy regulation, pre-commitment to reduce audit costs, and 
the management of banking regulation. A conclusion summarizes the ideas and discusses 
different open issues related to banks’ regulation. 
 
History of Banking Regulation 
 
John Karenten (1986) has documented the history of USA regulations governing commercial 
banks from 1863 to 1986. He has also proposed an analysis on how banks should be regulated. 
 
Before 1863, only state governments had the power to regulate banks and this consisted merely 
in issuing bank charters. In 1863, the federal government took an interest in bank regulation. The 
National Bank Act of 1864 provided that a federal agency, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), would thenceforth have the power to charter banks. The federal government’s 
bank chartering powers expanded rapidly. In 1864 the federal government passed the National 
Bank Act which stipulated that newly chartered banks had to buy federal debt and issue notes 
provided by the treasury. This was done partly to meet the federal government’s need for money 
to face the fiscal crisis arising in the aftermath of the Civil War. In 1913, the Federal Reserve 
Board (Board of Governors) was created along with 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks. 
 
At the beginning of the new regulatory period, the federal government was mostly concerned with 
the quality of assets. During the early years, federal banks were not able to have branches and 
this limited their geographical expansion. In 1933, federal banks attained parity with state-
chartered banks in their ability to open branches. However, they were still prohibited from creating 
interstate branches and hence from national banking. The same restriction was imposed on Bank 
Holding Companies. The federal government really became the dominant figure in the 
management of banking regulation when it implemented federal deposit insurance in 1934. 
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The 1950s introduced significant changes in banking. The Bank Holding Company Act was 
passed in 1956 and some important acquisitions and mergers—particularly in New York City—
were observed. In 1960, The Bank Merger Act establishing how and from whom permission must 
be obtained for mergers became part of the regulation. Before 1963, the Department of Justice 
was not involved in bank mergers because it was believed that the antitrust statutes did not apply 
to banks. In 1966, however, a new act gave the Department of Justice the right to challenge any 
bank acquisition or merger approved by the OCC, the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation) or the FRB (Federal Reserve Board). 
 
The question of regulating risks and monitoring safe banking became an important issue in the 
earlier years of federal government interventions. One of the goals was to make the supervision 
of banks more effective. Another was to create a lender-of-last-resort mechanism, particularly 
designed for banks in the federal system with liquidity problems—a kind of deposit insurance 
system. However, the board allowed many banks to fail in the early 1930s. The federal 
government’s role as insurer started in earnest in 1934, with its creation of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which was allowed to offer coverage to banks outside the federal 
system. In this, the federal government achieved one of its long-standing objectives: to have all 
banks subject to its regulation. In Canada, the CDIC was created only in 1967, possibly because 
the banking industry is very different from that in the United States. 
 
Another important historical fact, as concerns the topic under discussion, was the decision to 
design federal deposit insurance programs with identical premiums for all banks. It is a well-
known fact that this type of insurance pricing is a potential source of adverse selection, as it 
reduces the insurance costs of bad risks and, thus, facilitates their entry into the industry. The 
federal deposit insurance systems were also designed to provide full coverage up to a maximum 
high enough to guarantee full coverage to the great majority of depositors. This second 
characteristic may generate a moral hazard problem, since depositors’ incentive to monitor bank 
risk is likely to become nil under full insurance. Insurance pricing based on individual risk is used 
in many insurance markets to reduce this form of moral hazard (Winter, 2000). Is this type of 
pricing sufficient for banks? The answer seems negative and we will see why in the next sections. 
 
After 1988, new regulations were introduced around the world. For example, 
1)  The USA FDIC act was improved in 1991; so was the CDIC in 1999. 
2)  England integrated the supervisory control over the activities of banks, insurance brokers, 
and securities dealers;   8
3)  The G 10 countries harmonized their regulations in 1988 with the Basle Accord. They are 
currently revising the Accord to increase market discipline. 
4)  The European Central Bank was created. 
 
In fact, current regulation takes many forms. Generally speaking, public intervention is concerned 
with: 
1)  Providing emergency liquidity assistance; 
2)  Designing optimal deposit insurance schemes; 
3)  Setting minimum solvency requirements for banks; 
4)  Supervising the banking industry by monitoring banks and closing those that do not comply 
with regulations. 
 
The Nature of Banks 
 
By definition, a bank is an institution whose daily operations consist in granting loans and 
receiving deposits. It differs from a mutual fund which invests deposits in traded securities and 
from a finance company which finances loans by issuing debt or equity (credit institutions) 
(Freixas and Rochet, 1997). The four main functions of a bank are: 
1)  To offer access to a payment system that reduces transaction costs to a minimum in the 
economy. 
2)  To transform non-liquid assets into liquid assets: this function introduces a liquidity risk 
(arising from the difference in duration  between loans (assets) and deposits (liability) 
because banks hold only a fraction of the deposits. 
3)  To manage risks, including that of liquidity. This has been an important new function since 
the early 1980s. It has modified significantly the basic role of banks in the economy as well 
as the regulation of that role. This new activity was mainly developed to meet competition 
from other financial institutions. Many transactions, such as swaps on interest rates, are not 
related to the bank’s liabilities or assets but rather to random cash flows. They are therefore 
classified as off-balance-sheet operations. Moreover, some of these risk-management 
positions may actually flirt with risk in order to increase profits. 
4)  To process information and monitor borrowers in order to develop a long-term relationship 
with borrowers and limit the effects of information problems. 
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Before considering the connection between off-balance-sheet operations and risk-management 
activities, let us review the connection between the role of banks in creating liquidity and their role 
in processing information and monitoring borrowers, for these two roles are closely linked.  
 
The balance sheet corresponding to the basic role of a bank can be represented as follows. 
 
Figure 1 




Loans Equity  Capital 
 
 
According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983, 1986) the main services provided by banks are related 
to the following accounts: 
1) Deposits  are  banks’ principal liability. The other important entry is owners’ equity; 
2)  Loans are the principal asset. 
 
The basic roles of a bank are to receive liquid deposits and lend money in both short- and long-
term illiquid forms. In that sense, banks create liquidity, a function to which other financial 
institutions do not have access. This is true, because, as Figure 1 indicates, banks are obliged to 
keep in liquid reserve not 100% but only a fraction of deposits. The loan loss reserves represent 
the expected credit loss. Banks are, however, obliged to meet all the demands for liquid 
withdrawals made by depositors. This role poses the major risk for banks. As long as the 
reserves are sufficient to cover all withdrawals, the banking system will work efficiently. If, for 
whatever the reason, depositors’ demands for liquidity at a particular bank exceed that bank’s 
reserves, it will be obliged to liquidate its illiquid assets (or loans) and may go into bankruptcy if it 
cannot respond quickly enough.  
 
In that sense, banks are financial intermediaries that provide services to both sides of the balance 
sheet. Liability services, such as holding deposits, are offered to the depositors. In this way, 
banks offer depositors the possibility of returns they could not obtain by trading their assets 
directly with borrowers (Bryant, 1980). This transformation of illiquid loans into liquid deposits is 
the definition of creation of liquidity proposed by Diamond and Dibvig (1983, 1986). The clearing   10
of transactions and holding of currency inventories are the two most important liability services 
offered by banks. These services now have many substitutes in the economy and these 
transformations have weakened the traditional links between the money supply and bank 
deposits. So banks may become less important for monetary policy. (See, however, the recent 
papers on monetary policy transmission and particularly, Van den Heuvel, 2003.) Banks also offer 
a form of portfolio diversification or insurance to depositors by diversifying their deposits across 
many lending contracts instead of leaving them as a fraction of a single contract. In other words, 
the failure risk of a particular investment project is shared by all depositors. This risk sharing is 
usually seen to be efficient when compared with alternatives in the financial markets. 
 
This type of service differs from the federal funds that create liquidity within the banking industry. 
For example, small deposit-rich banks may lend their extra deposits to large deposit-poor banks 
that, in turn, lend the money they borrow. In this case, the large banks provide the transformation 
service (from illiquid loans to liquid deposits) while the small banks do not (from liquid deposits to 
liquid deposits). So there is no double counting. 
 
On the liability side, banks also play a protective role for ex ante, risk-averse depositors who are 
uncertain about the timing of their future consumption needs. Indeed, Bhattacharya, Boot and 
Thakor (1998) show that banks are efficient in providing short- run consumption possibilities to 
depositors, which is an important supplementary role on the liability side. In other words, banks 
improve risk sharing and enhance ex ante welfare by promising higher payoffs for early 
consumption and lower payoffs for late or delayed consumption in comparison to a world where 
such intermediaries would be absent. Consequently, this intermediation improves liquidity and 
risk sharing for many agents in the economy. (See also Diamond and Dybvig, 1986, on this 
issue.) 
 
The financial intermediary services on the asset side are motivated by the presence of 
information problems in the lending market: ex ante monitoring costs (adverse selection) and 
contract monitoring costs (ex ante and ex post moral hazard). This bank activity increases welfare 
when monitoring costs in the economy are high, because banks can often count on economies of 
scale in their management of monitoring costs (Diamond, 1984). Without such intermediation, 
monitoring costs would be duplicated by investors or depositors. Competitive sellers of such 
services are still viewed, in the literature, as imperfect substitutes for banks: problems of 
credibility and less efficiency in capturing the full returns of monitoring. Moreover, institutions   11
capable of monitoring many possibly interrelated projects provide depositors or investors a 
certain degree of diversification. 
 
Converting illiquid assets into liquid assets is the main bank service associated with both sides of 
the balance sheet. This transformation service is crucial when considering different forms of 
banking regulation. The conversion of illiquid claims into liquid claims is like averaging out the 
large numbers of individual depositors and allowing a transfer of ownership without transferring 
the loan-monitoring task of the banks (this feature keeps other institutions and depositors 
themselves from imitating banks). As pointed out by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and later by 
Diamond and Rajan (2001), it is this dual role played by banks that makes them fragile. 
 
As a complement to this argumentation, Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998) present a 
standard banking model with either ex post moral hazard or ex ante adverse selection in the 
loans market. They confirm the usual results (Gale and Hellwig, 1985): debt contracts are optimal 
in the presence of these information problems and efficiency can increase with the size of banks 
because banks can use the law of large numbers to obtain, on average, non-negative profits 
when investment projects are independent. Dionne and Viala (1992, 1994) have shown that debt 
contracts can also be optimal when both forms of moral hazard are present simultaneously and 
when audit costs are high when compared with incentive costs (Innes, 1990). So one can 
conclude that, in the presence of asymmetrical information problems, debt contracts should be 
optimal (particularly in long- term relationships) and large banks should be efficient. 
Consequently, regulation should not limit banks in their use of debt contracts (when audit cost are 
sufficiently high) and should not introduce restrictions on the size of banks, as long as there is 
competition. 
 
The difficulties for a bank begin when many individuals start to withdraw their money earlier than 
expected. In such a scenario, consumption and profits may become unfeasible if liquid deposits 
are not sufficient. Because banks may not be able to satisfy the demands for withdrawals, this 
may also induce other individuals to withdraw their money and a bank run is possible. Such bank 
runs are socially counter productive as they force premature liquidation of entrepreneurs’ projects 
and reduce consumption possibilities. 
 
This type of externality is often used to justify banking regulations, but some authors have argued 
that, when the shocks to individuals are identically and independently distributed (iid), it is 
possible for a bank to anticipate them and, under full commitment, regulation is not necessary.   12
However, full commitment is never observed (even full commitment by governments). Moreover, 
decisions are often correlated, and, in that situation, matters are more complicated and liquidity 




The main argument for regulation is that banks are special. When they fail there may be third-
party effects, because bank liabilities come in the form of money or very liquid assets. 
 
The goal of banking regulation is to provide a safe-and-sound banking industry that will protect 
depositors and promote good investment policies among banks. Since banks constitute a special 
industry, the instruments of banking regulation must then be specific to that economic sector 
(Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Banking regulation may not always, in the strict sense, manage to 
improve welfare. From the viewpoint of prudential regulation (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993), 
banking rules may create at least two types of distortions: excessive risk-taking by managers and 
implicit taxes that exhaust the entire surplus (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). So the basic form 
of bank regulation may itself explain the need for more sophisticated forms of regulation than 
those used to protect liquidity risk, such forms must be sophisticated enough to supervise the way 
banks manage their risks. 
 
The current regulation of banks’ risk management has three pillars: 
1)  Adequate instruments to compute capital requirements and assess  risks on private markets. 
2)  Appropriate supervision of banks. It is important to have clear statements as to when and 
how supervisors will intervene. 
3)  Practice of market discipline. There is also a need for clear statements as to how market 
discipline can be generated. 
 
Let us begin, in this section, with the protection of liquidity risk. According to the discussion in the 
previous section on basic banking activities, economic regulation is explained by the fact that 
society wants a guarantee of transaction balances that can prevent the economic externalities of 
liquidity contraction and also wants a public service that protects the average unsophisticated 
depositor against monetary losses. Some have also argued that, to have a stable monetary 
system, the balances in demand deposit or transaction accounts must be free from any default   13
risk. In other words, when banks fail there may be third-party effects because banks’ liabilities are 
money (Kareken, 1986). 
 
Because banks practise payment on demand and on short notice, lack of liquidity is much more 
crucial for banks than for other businesses. So if depositors believe that the liquidity of an 
institution is suspect, they will withdraw their funds, since many safe alternatives do exist. 
 
Banks are therefore particularly vulnerable to runs. Runs can easily spread to other institutions 
and these institutions can also be put in danger. This may result in financial stringency and 
financial contraction. Clearly, it is not just the losses from isolated failures that concern authorities 
but also the domino effect of such events on other financial institutions, government securities, 
and safe havens. In panics, banks might have to suspend their conversion of deposits into 
currency, call back loans, and thus threaten the entire economy with illiquidity. 
 
Many solutions for reducing the social costs of bank runs have been discussed in the literature. In 
the 1980s when risk-management problems and off-balance-sheet transactions were not yet 
significant factors in banking activities, three such solutions were already popular: deposit 
insurance, government loans, and suspension of the convertibility of deposits into currency. 
 
Suspension of convertibility does not solve the liquidity demand problem, except in situations 
where the bank run is motivated by unfounded apprehensions based on false information. But it 
does provide temporary relief. According to Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998) and as a 
general rule, restricting withdrawals to the liquid funds available is not fair to depositors. Deposit 
insurance is better, in the sense that it limits withdrawals to the strictly necessary and forestalls 
the possibility of panic by maintaining confidence in the banking system. 
 
For many years, deposit insurance has been the most effective device for preventing runs, 
because deposit insurance makes single banks out of risky activity. In that sense, deposit 
insurance improves welfare by protecting the creation of liquidity which, up to now in this survey, 
has been the major role of banks. This is the standard welfare-improving argument associated 
with the presence of insurance in the absence of information problems. But here the welfare 
argument for the use of deposit insurance has two dimensions: 1) In case of bankruptcy, it covers 
depositors and 2) its availability reduces the threats of bank runs and systemic risks. Matters are, 
however, not quite so simple when information problems associated with deposit insurance arise, 
because problems of this sort may destroy the insurance value. Before analysing the nature of   14
deposit insurance in the presence of information problems, let us first discuss another solution to 
the bank-run problem: a 100% bank reserve. 
 
This solution limits banks to its liability side and ends their transformation of illiquid assets into 
liquid ones. The 100% bank reserve has been categorized as a dangerous alternative to deposit 
insurance by Diamond and Dybvig (1986), because it will introduce substantial economic damage 
by reducing the overall level of liquidity. According to these authors, the same problem of liquidity 
risk will reappear in the long run, when society will be faced with controlling the other institutions 
which will have rushed into the vacuum left by the banks in the financing of investment projects. 
 
According to Goodhart (1987) even narrow banks would require the assistance of central banks, 
because of the composition of their asset portfolio. So, to eliminate banking regulation by means 
of a 100% bank reserve, banks’ portfolios would have to be limited to very special assets such as 
non-risky bonds or investments in riskless securities. 
 
One way to reduce the insurer’s and regulator’s monitoring costs is to consider the possibility of 
exposing banks to subordinated debt. If banks had to rely on short-term subordinated debt open 
to frequent renegotiation, private lenders would be able to discipline the banks but the latter 
would be more fragile. We shall come back on this solution later. Other regulatory instruments 
considered for the security of the banking industry are: setting ceilings on deposit-interest rates; 




In the USA, deposit insurance covers a maximum of $100,000 US for an individual account. In 
Canada, the maximum is $60,000 CAD and in England it is 20,000€. It has been often argued 
that more failures are observed in countries where the insurance coverage is generous, because 
bankers, less closely monitored by their depositors, take excessive risks. In New Zealand, since 
1994, there has been no deposit insurance. Banks are not supervised by the regulator but are 
required to disclose information on their accounts, and bank directors are personally liable in case 
of false disclosure statements. 
 
It would be interesting to investigate in detail what the causes of bank failures were before 
deposit insurance. And what were the economic consequences of such bankruptcies?   15
Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998) summarise some empirical evidence and compare the 
USA to Canada. 
 
It has been argued in the literature that deposit insurance has a social cost because the insurer 
must tax all individuals in order to finance the potential withdrawals from a particular bank. This is 
not a valid argument because, ex ante, all depositors would have agreed, in a free-choice 
insurance market, to pay that cost in order to have access to the insurance coverage. This is like 
saying that liability insurers introduce a social cost when they collect premiums to finance 
accident claims. On the contrary, it is easy to show, under perfect information, that risk-averse 
individuals are always willing to pay a fair premium to reduce the risk of accident. A fair premium 
means a premium equal to the insured’s expected claim. Under these conditions, full coverage is 
obtained or the risk eliminated for the insured, in this case for the depositors. The further 
advantage of full deposit insurance is that it can reduce runs. In other words, with full deposit 
insurance, other safety regulations would not be necessary, because an appropriate pricing 
system for deposit insurance can be used without costs. 
 
When there is imperfect information either between insurers and bank managers or between 
depositors and bank managers, full coverage with an average premium corresponding to average 
risk in the banking sector or industry cannot be optimal and may prove to be a less efficient 
regulatory mechanism than other market discipline mechanisms. 
 
There are two broad information problems in the insurance literature: adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Adverse selection is due to the fact that exogenous factors affecting individual risk are 
observable by the insured (here the banks) but not by the insurer. Ex ante moral hazard is 
explained by the fact that the policy holder’s prevention activities are private information and 
costly to monitor by the insurer, whereas ex post moral hazard is explained by the insurer’s 
difficulty in observing the true nature of the accident (bankruptcy) when it occurs.  
 
For deposit insurance, adverse selection may be particularly important when a new bank enters 
the market or when merger and acquisition activities change the nature of a bank. They may also 
become important when banks change their business activities. Chan, Greebaum, and Thakor 
(1992) have concluded that setting an optimal pricing for banks is practically impossible in a pure 
adverse-selection model with self-selection of the insurance contracts among different risk types. 
Freixas and Rochet (1995) show that optimal pricing is feasible in a world where banks manage 
deposits, but they also imply that it would involve cross-subsidies between banks: efficient banks   16
would be called upon to subsidise inefficient ones. Consequently, this might affect the industry’s 
entry and exit decisions. But this conclusion comes from a particular model (with self-selection) 
that is not necessarily appropriate for our purpose. How is it that insurance companies are able to 
insure large corporations and reinsurers are able to insure insurance firms—both types of 
institutions that are almost as complicated as banks? 
 
For ex ante moral hazard, the main prevention activities, that are not observable by the insurer, 
are related to the selection of investment projects or to any other risky activity that affects the 
probability of bank failure. As concerns ex post moral hazard (often related to fraud), the insurer’s 
ability to observe the exact nature of the residual loss is important. Auditing losses is the more 
appropriate mechanism for obtaining ex post information. Interim audits may also be convenient 
when the insurer accepts to cover partial losses instead of waiting for bankruptcy. 
 
Let us discuss in more detail the ex ante moral hazard problem, since, according to the literature, 
it seems to be the more significant problem. However, we must say that we have not yet found 
any empirical studies on the significance of information problems in the deposit insurance 
business. (On empirical methodologies for measuring the significance of information problems in 
insurer portfolio, see Chiappori, 2000, and Dionne, 2000. It is noteworthy that empirical results in 
the automobile insurance sector show ex ante optimal risk classification to be efficient in 
eliminating residual asymmetrical information problems in insurer portfolios; see Chiappori and 
Salanie, 2000, and Dionne et al., 2001.) 
 
Without ex ante moral hazard, the cash-flow distribution of investment projects is perfectly 
observable by the insurer. It is clear that banks can affect this distribution by choosing their 
investment projects with managers’ actions that are not observable. One implication of an 
insurer’s passive role regarding this form of moral hazard is that deposit insurance may end up 
reducing market discipline by increasing the ratio of high-risk loans for the same deposits and 
liquid reserves, because more riskier projects will be chosen than in a situation of full information. 
So, in the absence of any insurance-contracting mechanism designed to reduce the extra risk-
taking explained by moral hazard, additional regulations limiting risk-taking by banks may be 
required to keep the total risk constant. 
 
Some authors have argued that market discipline generated by depositors would reduce this form 
of moral hazard and that partial insurance coverage can be an appropriate mechanism in the long 
run. In the extreme case without any insurance coverage, the theory is the following, if we use a   17
two-period model: Suppose, in a first step, that banks have received their deposits in fixed 
payments and that there is no deposit insurance. The banks may then be tempted to choose risky 
projects (in the second-order stochastic sense), because this would increase expected benefits 
for the shareholders. However, in the long run, market discipline will counterbalance this type of 
behaviour because depositors can always withdraw their money from a risky bank, if they 
observe, at the end of the first period, that the bank has more risky projects than those 
anticipated at the beginning of the contracting period. Of course, this information has to be 
available at low cost to depositors. Moreover, depositors must have incentives to spend for this 
information. Without deposit insurance, the incentives would be present. They would probably 
also be present with partial insurance. However, it is not clear that small depositors would have 
the information and the competence required to be efficient auditors. Usually, creditors 
(depositors) are small and uninformed. They may not be in a position to monitor bank managers. 
The role of the regulator is therefore to represent their interests and act on their behalf. 
 
Moreover, this type of partial insurance argumentation is appropriate only for the individual 
coverage that deposit insurance offers against isolated events or bankruptcies. We must not 
forget that full deposit insurance also has another social value related to panics or contagious 
bank runs, in that depositors will rest assured or confident when they are fully covered. It is 
interesting to observe that, over the years that full insurance has been available in North America, 
many bankruptcies have been observed but no significant panics nor contagious runs have been 
documented.  
 
How then can we reduce the social cost of moral hazard and keep the nearly full coverage 
option? One instrument that is frequently used in insurance markets is pricing insurance in terms 
of the potential clients risk level with continuous auditing of the managers actions. Various 
difficulties can be associated with this mechanism, but it can prove to be just as efficient as partial 
insurance in the long run, particularly when the insurer is a monopoly because the insured (here 
the bank) cannot leave. In the banking industry, the supplementary advantage would be keeping 
the risk of bank runs at a minimum. Of course, a public insurer must find some financial incentive 
to invest money in monitoring banks. We shall come back to incentives designed to encourage 
public insurers to spend money on monitoring and to protect their independence from political 
influences. Moreover, because of the very nature of bank-run problems, rating cannot be based 
on past claims accumulated over time but must rather rely on ex ante risk evaluation. This 
introduces difficulties associated with auditing the assets and liabilities of banks (Bond and 
Crocker, 1993).   18
 
One means of encouraging the monitoring of bank risk is to introduce a private, regulated 
monopoly or even many private insurers into the system. The market could then fix the 
appropriate level of risk for banks. But the government might still have to back the coverage of 
large losses in order to minimize the risk of panics. Transition to the private sector may, however, 
be difficult to achieve because of lack of confidence on the side of depositors. One way would be 
to go about it progressively. This could reduce moral hazard if private insurers were capable of 
offering contracts tailored to individual risks. 
 
Another way is to separate the banks’ lending and depository roles and to reduce moral hazard 
by introducing a 100% reserve on deposits. This is a complete solution for the moral hazard 
problem in deposit insurance, because the need for such insurance would then disappear. But it 
would mean a radical change in the nature of banks. Loans would be made by funds instead of 
banks and (very) short-term loans would disappear. Moreover, as discussed in a previous 
section, this would mean a significant reduction of banks’ involvement in resource allocation, as it 
would eliminate their ability to create liquidity by converting illiquid assets into liquid liabilities. Are 
there other ways of providing liquidity to depositors?  
 
Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998) discuss in detail regulatory measures presented in the 
literature to reduce moral hazard: 
 
1)  Cash asset reserve requirements. This measure is, however, difficult to implement because 
wide fluctuations associated with deposits and consequently with cash reserves are often 
observed for reasons not related to moral hazard. 
2)  Another measure is to relate the bank’s shareholder capital infusion to the bank’s risk level. 
This measure imposes the choice of high-risk  investment policies on shareholders. As for the 
pricing of insurance based on individual risk, the key element for implementing this measure 
is the regulator’s or insurer’s ability to observe the bank’s risk. 
3)  Market discipline. Two other risk-sensitive measures available as substitutes are partial 
insurance coverage and the emission of (uninsured) subordinated debt. In both cases, there 
would be increased monitoring by depositors or lenders of liquidity. The authors even 
mention a study showing that depositors may be more effective auditors than public agencies 
because the latter will not always have the appropriate incentives.   19
4)  Bank closure policy. This measure can reduce monitoring costs and lower bankruptcy costs, 
but it is not clear that this would outperform the preceding measures. More research is 
needed. 
5)  The role of bank charter value. Banks are not necessarily identical and may earn a higher 
charter value matching their higher yields. For example, some banks may be more efficient in 
monitoring the loans they offer. There should be a link between the way banks are regulated 
and their potential charter values. But the authors do not clearly identify this link, except for 
the claim that banks with a higher charter value should be less risky. So a high charter value 
might make it possible to design a better incentive-compatible, risk-sensitive capital 
requirement and a lower deposit-risk premium. 
 
Another important question is the following: Are there alternatives to deposit insurance? Inter-
bank loans can provide liquidity but they have proved to be inefficient. Recently, the USA 
modified the FDIC system to allow the insurer to intervene before it is too late. A full set of 
indicators or ratings is used. But this instrument is complementary to deposit insurance and not a 
substitute for it. 
 
The central bank could also provide such insurance for liquidity and increase the efficiency of 
inter-bank loans. In that sense, the central bank could replace deposit insurance as a lender of 
last resort when liquidity is needed. But it has been said that this might introduce conflicts of 
interest between the function of monetary policy and that of risk regulation. For example, in a 
situation where the central bank wants to push the money supply via the banking system it might, 
in the short run, be less willing to close a bank or to let it go into bankruptcy because of the 
possible impact on the first objective. It is better to have an independent agency. In the situation 
of an important liquidity crisis, the central bank can always make a loan to the deposit insurer that 
will be reimbursed in the long run as for any other catastrophic risk. 
 
Market discipline using stockholders’ and managers’ liability can also be a substitute for bank 
regulations. For example, some authors have proposed that subordinated debt should be used to 
increase market discipline along with this form of liability (Evanoff and Wall, 2000). This can be an 
instrument for extracting information from the market and increasing discipline only if stockholders 
and top managers are truly expropriated in case of failure. Again there is a commitment problem 
associated to the implementation of the instrument. Up to now, out of the 104 cases documented 
by Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1998), 73 resulted in bail-outs and 31 in liquidation. 
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But market discipline can be a dangerous game, particularly when market prices become erratic. 
Market discipline is based on private ratings. Are these private ratings really good risk indicators? 
Conflicts of interest between rating agencies and banks are possible, but more importantly, the 
informational value of rating agencies is often considered as weak. 
 
The above discussion raised the need for precise information on individual banks’ risk in order to 
set the appropriate incentives for risk management. Acquisition of this information might be very 
costly. Mechanisms other than audits might be more efficient. S. Kobayakawa (1998) proposes a 
model that will enable regulators to ensure that riskier banks will maintain higher capital holdings. 
The goal of this type of research is to reduce the burden of control and audit costs by using the 
theory of incentives in relationship to regulation (Laffont and Tirole, 1994). We shall come back to 
this model later. 
 
One last point on deposit insurance—one that is not often mentioned—concerns its effect on 
banks’ profits. The presence of deposit insurance reduces the risk to depositors, so banks can 
offer interest payments at rates close to the risk-free rate and invest the money in high risk 
investments (Berlin et al., 1991). But this difference may also be used for paying insurance 
premiums with appropriate monitoring. 
 
Capital Adequacy and Bank Regulation 
 
The banking industry has undergone important modifications since the beginning of the 1980s. To 
be specific, competition from other financial institutions and between banks has increased. Banks 
now offer new products and participate in new markets (Crouhy et al. 2001). This increased 
scope opens a greater variety of deposit-generating activities to banks and other institutions. 
Recent regulation related to universal banking is concerned with the increased scope of banking 
and its links with capital requirement. 
 
One important change as regards our topic is that banks are much more active in risk-shifting 
activities. They are involved in the design and trading of cash instruments and derivatives. 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank, US banks had more than $37 trillion of off-balance 
assets and liabilities in 1996, whereas they possessed only about $I trillion dollars of such assets 
and liabilities in 1986. (Crouhy et al. 2001, page 3). 
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This exposure to new activities has increased the risk exposure of banks, which explains the 
need to impose new capital requirements on the G 10 group in the 1980s. Moreover, deposit 
insurance was not then priced according to individual risk and the potential for moral hazard was 
significant. Optimal capital requirements should force shareholders to put more of their 
participation at risk and should strengthen their resolve to take fewer high-risk positions or to 
reduce moral hazard. 
 
The current regulation is based on three pillars (Descamps, Rochet, and Roger, 2002): 
1)  Adequate instruments to compute capital requirements and assess  risks on private markets. 
2)  Appropriate supervision of banks. It is important to have clear statements as to when and 
how supervisors will intervene. 
3)  Practice of market discipline. There is also a need for clear statements as to how market 
discipline can be generated. 
 
Hence, since 1988, we observe the use of more capital regulation to reduce the probability of 
failure. This new regulation also increases stockholders’ incentive to monitor managers more 
carefully, because the former have more to lose in case of failure since part of the capital is their 
own. Stockholders have more to lose when banks have more capital, but recent modifications in 
the way market risk is handled have made it possible to use short-term subordinated debt to meet 
daily market risk (Tier 3), under certain conditions. For credit risk, Tier 1 and Tier 2 are used: This 
includes stockholders’ equity; non-cumulative preferred stock; interest in consolidated 
subsidiaries in Tier 1; cumulative perpetual preferred shares and 99-year debentures in Tier 2 
(Crouhy et al., 2001). However, current regulations have been criticised for allowing banks to 
substitute government securities for private loans in their portfolio of assets. (For a recent study 
on this issue, see Furfine, 2000.) 
 
The recent research on capital requirements shows that, whereas they may indeed improve the 
solvency of the high-risk bank, increased capital requirements may also create distortions in the 
behaviour of banks because the standards are the same for all banks. Current risk regulation 
provides no benefits for credit-risk diversification, though it does make room for adjustments for 
market risk via the use of internal models to compute the corresponding capital. So, under the 
current regulation of credit risk, the safer banks have no incentives to improve their risky position 
and the risky banks have received an implicit advantage. It is not clear that the overall risk is 
lower than before in the market. In fact, there is no empirical study showing any link between 
capital requirement and banks’ risk.   22
 
Banks also operate in a much more competitive environment because of the deregulation of 
financial markets and globalisation. They have more competition from non-banking institutions. 
The banking business is also much more complex because of financial innovations and much 
more sophisticated management practices. Big banks have developed internal systems for 
computing economic capital and they want these models to be used for the regulation of capital 
related to credit risk. This will increase the cost of monitoring for capital regulation and for deposit 
insurance based on individual risk to the level already existing for capital related to market risks. 
Consequently, some authors have proposed that subordinated debt should be used to increase 
market discipline and reduce auditing costs (Evanoff and Wall, 2000). 
 
Many authors have discussed the effects of capital adequacy on banks’ behaviour (Koehn and 
Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992; Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley 
and Furlong, 1990) but few have considered formally the ex ante moral hazard problem 
discussed in the previous sections of this review. Santos (1999) proposes a model with moral 
hazard between borrowers and banks in the presence of deposit insurance and capital regulation. 
He shows that optimal contracts introduce an incentive scheme leading borrowers to lower their 
risks, which also reduces the bank’s risks. Other partial equilibrium contributions have also been 
proposed by Besanko and Kanatas (1996) as concerns conflicts between banks’ managers and 
shareholders and by Bensaid et al. (1995) as concerns the effects of adverse selection on the 
quality of banks’ assets and the effects of moral hazard on the performance of bank managers. 
They find that optimal regulation of solvency must allow adjustments for risks and provide for 
monitoring by independent agencies. But these contributions do not really consider off-balance-
sheet operations and their monitoring. 
 
Two natural questions become: Must banks have capital reserves for all types of off-balance-
sheet transactions? The answer is yes. How do these new activities affect the bank’s role in 
converting illiquid assets into liquid assets? The answer to this last question is less direct but it 
can be said that some risk management instruments have increased banks’ liquid assets. In other 
words, some instruments decrease the liquidity risk by permitting banks to have very rapid access 
to liquid assets. In that sense, risk management should have reduced the need for deposit 
insurance. If the closure rules related to capital adequacy are enforced, deposit insurance should 
have only a residual role to play in the optimal regulation of capital adequacy. But the converse 
may also be true: Do we need strong capital adequacy rules when deposit insurance pricing is   23
optimal? Are these two instruments substitutes or complements? There are very few contributions 
on these questions in the literature. 
 
If banks act as portfolio managers when they choose the composition of their portfolios of assets 
and liabilities, then it is advisable to use risk-related weights for the computation of the capital-to-
asset ratio, because switching assets is a delicate operation. However, markets are not complete. 
Like Crouhy and Galai (1986), Kareken and Wallace (1978) propose a complete market 
framework and show that, in this context, capital regulation is dominated by the use of risk-related 
insurance premiums as instruments for solving the moral hazard problem. But complete markets 
do not exist in real life. 
 
To what extent should the optimal design of deposit insurance and capital requirement be made 
jointly? Giammorino, Lewis, and Sapptington (1993) do not answer this difficult question directly 
but instead consider a model with potential moral hazard when the objective of the regulator is to 
provide optimal deposit insurance. They show that the insurance premium must be a function of 
the risk contained in the bank’s loans portfolio and that low-risk banks should face lower capital 
requirements. Bond and Crocker (1993) obtain a similar result on the value of offering capital 
requirements and optimal deposit insurance jointly, in a model where banks have private 
information and risk classification is used to reduce the information asymmetry. Capital 
requirement remains necessary as long as the insurer risk classification scheme cannot eliminate 
the residual information problem in the risk classes. It can also be shown, in a model where the 
self-selection of risks is used to reduce adverse selection, that capital requirements may generate 
a positive value by reducing the cost of obtaining private information on banks’ risk (Freixas and 
Gabillon, 1998). 
 
But for the moment, in what concerns credit risk, the BIS Accord treats all banks alike, so this 
type of regulation is not of any obvious use in complementing the optimal pricing of deposit 
insurance. It is also not clear that the current capital ratios are good measures of banks’ risk. A 
new regulation based on banks’ internal models may increase the incentive for banks to reduce 
their risk and disclose its value, but it will also increase the cost of auditing deposit insurance 
unless appropriate market instruments are used to reflect the market evaluation of these asset 
risks. The current internal models proposed in the literature for computing the optimal economic 
capital for credit risk are indeed very sophisticated (Gordy, 2000; Crouhy, Galai, and Mark, 2000), 
and many issues are still open. 
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Consequently, under the current capital regulation of banks, it is clear that deposit insurance must 
be set with premiums related to the individual risk of the banks. In other words, one cannot use 
the current Basle regulation as a substitute for this pricing scheme. 
 
Descamps et al. (2002) propose a model that sets conditions under which market discipline can 
reduce the capital requirements needed to prevent moral hazard. They obtain two conclusions 
that are of importance in designing the optimal regulatory environment. Effective direct market 
discipline by the regulator is possible only if banking supervisors are free from political 
interference. Indirect market discipline cannot be efficient in crises, because market prices 
become erratic. So a public provision for deposit coverage is necessary. 
 
Regulation and Pre-Commitment 
 
Pre-commitment is a model for bank regulation that is proposed as an alternative to the internal 
models for market risk in order to reduce audit costs and maintain the same incentives. 
 
A first pre-commitment model was proposed by Kulplec and O’Brien (1995, 1997) to reduce the 
regulatory burden of internal models. This model incorporates an assessment of banks’ 
effectiveness in managing their risks (here market risks) and puts greater emphasis on the 
incentives for a bank to avoid losses exceeding the limit predetermined. They suggest the use of 
the value at risk (VaR) to fix the amount of capital. Of course, this type of model can be applied to 
any type of risk-taking activity, such as lending to private firms. 
 
Under the pre-commitment approach, a bank announces the appropriate level of capital needed 
to cover the maximum value of expected loss. If the actual amount exceeds the value announced 
the bank is penalised. In this model, the penalty rate is uniform and is not a function of the bank’s 
declared risk. This is a mechanism to encourage monitoring, and the bank’s objective is to 
minimise the total cost of the expected penalty as well as the cost of raising capital. 
 
In the Kulpec and O’Brien model, it is not clear however that the riskier banks will reveal their true 
level of risk, because the mechanism supposes that the revelation is made only ex post. 
Kobayakawa (1998) proposes an alternative where the incentive-compatible contract fixes both 
the level of capital and the penalty rate, where both are chosen by the banks, ex ante, from a   25
menu of contracts. The menu of contracts is predetermined by the regulator or the deposit 
insurer. 
 
At equilibrium, the author obtains that different banks choose different contracts and different 
levels of capital. The current model does not really document the type of information the regulator 
would need to implement the contracts. Another issue is to fix the limit of pressure a regulator can 
impose on a bank to obtain the true information. One possibility for the regulator is to use public 
disclosure and let the market impose the penalties. Finally, the author does not take into account 
the legal aspects of such an approach. 
 
Management of Banking Regulation 
 
One major difficulty with regulation is to ensure that government is truly committed to apply the 
rules. Recent papers argue that banking supervisors should not be involved in monetary policy. 
According to Rochet (2002), we too often see political pressures exerted on bank supervisors to 
bail out insolvent banks. More market discipline cannot be a remedy for this problem. Market 
discipline can be efficient only when political intervention is not anticipated. 
 
Even the definition of a safe banking system is subject to interpretation. For some regulators, safe 
means that, for small banks, a given failure should not degenerate into an epidemic of failures 
and that, for large banks, they should never fail at all (the too-large-to-go-bankrupt argument). 
When this interpretation is well understood by managers of large banks, public discipline 
becomes difficult to implement and tax payers may have to pay for the safety of large banks, even 
when there is no systemic risk. Rochet (2002) reports the case of Credit Lyonais in France but 
other cases have also been documented in the USA, particularly the Continental Illinois crisis in 
1984. 
 
It is clear, however, that the regulatory authorities must use their judgement and must not apply 
the rules too strictly and without discernment. One mechanism used during recent years has been 
to have the central bank become a lender of last resort when the liquidity problem arises from a 
particular situation. This was the type of intervention the NY FED used to save the Bank of New 
York when it had a big computer problem and the other banks were not able to find the money 
quickly enough. The Bank of England did not intervene in the Barrings case in 1995 for well-
known reasons, and it was estimated that tax payers should not have to pay for this type of   26
failure. But at the same time, the Bank of England made a public announcement of its willingness 
to provide liquidity to the banking system if a big market disturbance should happen and this was 
enough to prevent a panic. In both cases, tax payers had nothing to pay: the Bank of England did 
not pay for Barrings and the NY FED asked for collateral from the Bank of New York (Goodhart, 
1999).  
 
Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor (2002) analyse the independence of regulatory authorities. 
They discuss, in detail, the issue of the financial sector’s Regulatory and Supervisory 
Independence (RSI). This is an important issue because improper supervisory arrangements 
have contributed significantly to the deepening of several recent systemic banking crises around 
the world. They argue that RSI is important for financial stability for the same reasons that central 
banking independence (CBI) is important for monetary policy. For real independence, agency 
dependence and accountability needs must go hand in hand. The study also discusses a number 
of accountability arrangements. 
 
These issues have not really been discussed in previous articles in the literature and 
consequently in literature reviews. It is however documented that almost all the worldwide 
systemic financial sector crises occurring in the 1990s were due to the lack of independence 
between supervisory and political authorities (De Krivoy, 2000, on the Venezuelan Supervision, 
and Lindgren et al., 1999, on the East Asian crisis of 1997-1998). 
 
In Korea, prior to the 1997 crisis, commercial banks were under the direct authority of the 
monetary board. Specialized banks and non-bank financial institutions were under the direct 
authority of the ministry of finance and economy. Monitoring by the ministry was regarded as 
weak and this shortcomming, as responsible in part for the 1997 crisis (Lindgren et al., 1999). 
 
In Japan, lack of independence for the financial-supervision function within the ministry of finance 
is also interpreted as having contributed to the emergence of weaknesses in the financial sector 
(Kartcher, 1998). More recently, the Japanese Financial Services Agency has been made 
accountable to the prime minister’s office rather than the ministry of finance office. The results of 
this transfer are quite disappointing as regards the objectives of transparency and decisive 
authority. In fact, the lack of independence in this country is often interpreted as a potential 
source of systemic risk. 
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In Indonesia, political interference was even stronger with regard to the use of government funds 
for re-capitalization. Political interference has also been pointed to as a factor in that country’s 
crisis.  
 
Another aspect of the importance of RSI has to do with the most appropriate regulation and 
supervision of financial market structures, including the regulation of banking supervision both 
within and outside of the central bank. The tendency to move to unified financial-sector 
supervision often involves removing the banking supervision function from the central bank, 
where it had previously enjoyed a relatively high degree of independence derived from the central 
bank’s independence with respect to its monetary function. 
 
The document stresses that the key to effective regulation and supervision implies setting up 
proper accountability arrangements for the independent agency. Independence and 
accountability should be regarded as complementary instead of as a continuum implying trade-
offs between the two objectives. 
 
As documented in a previous section on the regulatory authority, we now know what the major 
motivation for regulating financial markets is to promote systemic stability or financial stability (the 
public-good argument): Provide liquidity; minimize the cost of systemic risks related to bank runs; 
sign deposit insurance contracts with appropriate incentives under adverse selection and moral 
hazard. (Goodhart et al. 1998) 
 
We saw that, to achieve these goals, regulation is necessary. But delegation of regulatory power 
is also very important. Delegation is often seen to be exercised via a government agency or a 
specific minister. A second type of delegation involves handing regulatory powers to an 
independent agency. Independence has two dimensions: independence from political 
interference and freedom of dominance from industry interests. The public interest should not be 
reduced to industrial or professional interests (Stigler, 1971).  
 
For financial stability it is important to have a credible and stable set of regulations which include 
rule-based exit policies for weak or insolvent financial institutions. Politicians may be interested in 
stalling actions in the short run, and, in the long run, supervisors may be pressured to bailout 
rather than liquidate. If this type of behaviour is anticipated, some bank managers will be tempted 
to increase their risk, knowing that their complete independence will not be observed by the 
politicians.   28
 
Four dimensions have to be taken into account to obtain independence: 
 
1) Regulatory  independence 
 
The agency must have an appropriate degree of autonomy in setting rules. Calomiris and Litan 
(2000) strongly emphasize the need for supervisors and regulators to respond quickly to 
changing international conditions and trends. 
 
To set the adequate level of autonomy, it is useful to separate the financial sector into three main 
categories: economic regulation (profits, pricing, entry and exit); prudential regulation (level of 
risk), the concern of this survey; and information regulation for the public and supervisors. 
Prudential regulation is directly related to the stability of the financial sector. It is also related to 
international rules and serves to obtain certain autonomy in setting prudential guidelines for the 
adoption of international best standards and practices. 
 
2) Supervisory  independence 
 
This is the most difficult dimension of independence. Governments often fail to punish enterprises 
that breach regulations and refuse to enforce sanctions. They may also prolong the life of 
insolvent institutions and increase the costs to taxpayers at a later stage. 
 
To increase independence it might be important to establish the following elements: legal 
protection for supervisors when executing their job; a rule-based system of sanctions and 
supervision favouring prompt corrective actions; appropriate salary levels for supervisors; and 
clear rules governing the layers of decisions and appeals in institutions. The process of licensing 
institutions and withdrawing their licences should be left up to the supervisory agency.  
 
3) Institutional  independence 
 
The institution must be independent of both the executive and legislation branches of 
government. An agency that is part of the executive branch, such as the ministry of finance, 
typically lacks independence. 
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4) Budgetary  independence 
 
It refers to the role of the executive/legislature in determining the agency’s budget. Supervisors 
who can independently decide on the sources, size, and use of their budget are better equipped 
to be more independent. 
 
Banks are the instruments for the transmission of monetary policy, so the central bank should be 
concerned about their soundness in constructing an efficient monetary policy. The central bank 
may have to act as the lender of last resort, so it must have access to information indicating 
which bank may have liquidity problems. 
 
However, there may be a conflict of interest between the two objectives. A central bank may 
adjust its monetary policy when it is concerned with the financial conditions of the banks and 
hence avoid the failure of some banks and this may affect its inflation control policy. Moreover, 
the central bank can be blamed for some bankruptcies which may affect its monetary policy. In 
general, successful organizations tend to have a clear and singular mandate.  
 
Very few countries have managed to integrate monetary policy with prudential regulation. It is 
generally recognised that conflicts of interest and the danger of damage to reputations are 
arguments against having supervisors in the central bank. Moreover, putting the RSI in the central 
bank would leave too much power to the latter and generate two conflicting objectives in the 
same institution. 
 
The recent literature on political economy and incentive stresses the fact that regulatory 
independence does not come free of any cost. It may, in fact, create collusive behaviour between 
regulators and interest groups (Laffont, 2000; Faure-Grimaud and Martimort, 2003). There are still 
open questions in the literature on the different trade-offs and more research is needed on the 




Banks are the financial institutions responsible for  providing liquidity to the economy. This 
responsibility is, however, the main cause of their fragility. Banks’ risks are regulated to protect 
liquidity in financial markets. The government is responsible for limiting the social costs related to   30
the liquidation of investment projects and the reduction of consumption possibilities bank runs or 
systemic risk may cause. 
 
Deposit insurance is the most efficient instrument for protecting depositors and for preventing 
bank runs. However, its presence may introduce some distortions in banks’ risk-management 
activities, because such activities are not perfectly observable by the insurer without cost. Many 
incentive schemes have been developed to reduce this form of moral hazard. Pricing deposit 
insurance according to the individual bank’s risk seems to be the most appropriate strategy but it 
does not seem to be sufficient in the sense that it seems to remain residual information problems 
in the market, although there is no appropriate statistical analysis on this issue. For the contract 
to be incentive compatible, the behaviour of the bank must be monitored during the length of the 
contract and premiums must be adjusted to changes in behaviour. Other direct forms of 
intervention by the regulator or the insurer may be necessary to complete the optimal pricing 
scheme in order to prevent opportunistic behaviours and panics (commitment problem from the 
banks when this pricing scheme is not sufficient). 
 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the banking industry has undergone important modifications. 
Banks must face much more international competition because of market globalisation but also 
much more national competition because of the deregulation of financial markets. The banking 
business is more complex and more involved in risk-shifting activities such as the design and 
trading of cash instruments and derivatives. Many of these transactions involve off-balance-sheet 
transactions which complicate the monitoring of banks as well as the individual pricing of deposit 
insurance. 
 
In 1988, the G10 modified banking regulation significantly by setting capital standards for 
international banks. These standards have now been adopted by more than one hundred 
countries as part of their  national regulation of banks’ risk. One major motivation for such 
regulation has been the development of international banking. The other motivation has been the 
moral hazard related to the fact that risk-shifting activities were not really monitored by deposit 
insurers in the 1980s because, at that time, deposit- insurance premiums were exactly the same 
for all banks. But risk-based pricing of deposit insurance with some form of monitoring is now the 
rule in many countries. 
 
Current regulation of bank capital adequacy has its critics because it imposes the same rules on 
all banks. This seems particularly unsuitable when applied to credit risk which is the major source   31
of a bank’s risk (about 70%). Moreover, diversification of a bank’s credit-risk portfolio is not taken 
into account in the computation of capital ratios. These shortcomings seem to have distorted the 
behaviour of banks and this makes it much more complicated to monitor them (Allen and Gale, 
2003; Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003). In fact, it is not even clear that the higher capital ratios 
observed since the introduction of this new form of capital regulation necessarily lower risks. 
 
More fundamentally, it is not evident that current capital ratios have any economic meaning in 
terms of the true economic capital needed to protect against credit risk, particularly for loans risk. 
One explanation is the following: The regulator imposes capital ratios that do not correspond to 
the bank’s optimal capital ratios; the bank then makes market adjustments by choosing other 
parameters which allow it to maximize shareholders’ value while taking into account the level of 
regulated capital as a constraint. Many instruments for doing this are available to banks, such as 
substituting assets with different risk levels in a given class of capital. 
 
Additional reform is expected in 2004, but there is as yet no consensus on the form it will take nor 
on whether it will suitably  regulate banks in individual countries. Consequently, it might be 
appropriate to continue developing national regulation based on optimal deposit insurance (with 
individual insurance pricing and continuous auditing on individual risk) and to keep searching for 
other optimal complementary instruments for use against systemic risk, instruments suitably 
designed to fit the banking industry’s peculiar structure. Other market discipline and governance 
instruments may be more efficient than the current capital requirement scheme for the banks’ 
commitment problem associated to deposit insurance. 
 
Further research is needed on at least four fronts: the empirical significance of information 
problems in the deposit insurer and bank relationship; the optimal pricing of deposit insurance 
when capital is regulated properly; and the optimal structure of the regulatory scheme involving 
the central bank, the regulator, and the deposit insurer. Who should be the lender of last resort? 
Who should decide that a particular bank must go into bankruptcy? Do we need the same capital 
regulation rules in each country? Another subject of research interest is banks’ governance in 
relation to risk regulation. 
 
From outside, it seems there are too many non-coordinated participants on the regulation of 
banks’ risk and that the regulatory rules seem more oriented to the international mode than to 
national needs. 
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The starting point for choosing building blocks would be a clear statement on the meaning of 
systemic risk and a clear definition of what role banks should play in the transmission of monetary 
policy in this regulatory environment. 
 
The central bank should be responsible for aggregate liquidity and, consequently, responsible for 
shoring up systemic stability related to aggregate economic fluctuations such as business cycles. 
In particular, the central bank should monitor how the current microeconomic regulation can affect 
the macroeconomic stability. 
 
Confidence in the financial sector is a public good that must be ensured by the government. Who 
should be in charge: the central bank or the regulatory agency? The revised literature seems to 
say that this role should be taken by a regulatory agency independent from the central bank and 
independent from the political power. 
 
The existence of deposit insurance was shown to be useful in covering unanticipated losses and 
in reducing bank runs. Its pricing must take into account of the different problems associated with 
residual asymmetrical information in the banking sector. However, an optimal pricing scheme with 
continuous audit does not seem sufficient because of the banks commitment problem and much 
effort has recently been invested in devising new capital requirement rules to better assess 
banks’ risk. However, other market discipline implying more liability for stockholders and 
managers (subordinated debt and corporate governance) may also be efficient and may 
represent less auditing costs. Duplication of monitoring activities by deposit insurer and capital 
requirement regulator is another issue. Another question for research is therefore: To what extent 
can market discipline or pre-commitment mechanisms be used to reduce some of these audit 
costs associated to capital requirement and deposit insurance? 
 
In conclusion, there is still no clear consensus in the literature on the optimal design for regulating 
banks. As things now stand, there is too much regulation: The current capital-ratio regulatory 
system— though very onerous for banks to implement and manage and very costly for the 
regulator to monitor—does not provide the desired results.   33
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